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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SALT LAKE CITY,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20001006-CA
CRAIG NORMAN HENDRICKS,
Priority No. 2
Defendant / Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for domestic violence
battery, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of § 11.08.020 of the Salt Lake City Code.
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78-2a-3(2)(e)(1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue for Review.
1. Did the trial judge commit error by instructing the jury regarding defense of
habitation on behalf of the victim to assist the jury in understanding the appellant's claim
of self-defense?
Standard of Review.
The propriety of a jury instruction is reviewed for correctness. State v. Brooks,
833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Salt Lake City Code § 11.08.020 states:
A battery is any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of
another. It is unlawful for any person to commit a battery within the limits of the city.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged by way of Information with having committed the
offenses of domestic violence battery and disturbing the peace on or about September 9,
2000, in Salt Lake City. Following arraignment and a pre-trial conference, the matter was
set for a jury trial. Trial before a jury was held on October 25, 2000, the Honorable Ann
Boyden, Judge, presiding. Appellant was convicted of the domestic violence battery
count and was sentenced that day. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal to this court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Lowell Hendricks rented a house at 953 South Denver Street in Salt Lake City. As
permitted under his lease, he allowed his brother Craig, the appellant herein, to live with
him as a permissive at-will guest with the understanding that Craig would give Lowell
some money to help with rent and utilities. (TR. 76 at 7, 8). On July 23, 2000, Lowell
and Craig had an argument and Lowell asked Craig to move out of the house. (TR. 76 at
6, 104). Craig voluntarily moved out of the house, quitting the premises, arranged
lodgings elsewhere, and discussed with Lowell and their father having their father assist
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with removal of Craig's belongings. (TR. 76 at 8, 10, 98, 103, 105). An arrangement
was worked out that the father would be present and assist in the removal of Craig's
belongings. (TR. 76 at 10, 98, 99).
On September 8, 2000, Craig went to Lowell's house and slept in the utility room
adjoining the kitchen. (TR. 76 at 7, 102). However, the kitchen door was locked and
Craig could not enter the main part of the house. This was the first time since July 23,
2000, that Craig had returned to the house or stayed there for any period of time. On
September 9, 2000, Lowell returned home at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening and saw
Craig working on his broken-down truck at the rear of the house. (TR. 76 at 9, 99-102).
Lowell walked a few steps down the driveway and said something to Craig about being at
the house. (TR. 76 at 13). Lowell then walked back up to the front of the house entered
the front door and locked it. Craig continued tinkering with his truck and later wandered
around the neighborhood and went to the park.

Sometime around 11:00 P.M. that

evening Craig returned to Lowell's house. (TR. 76 at 13, 107).
The testimony of Lowell and Craig regarding what happened after Craig returned
to Lowell's house is in conflict. In a nutshell, here are the two versions starting with
Lowell's version and then Craig's version.
Lowell testified that he heard a noise at the kitchen door and went to investigate.
He saw Craig entering the house from the utility room and while apparently walking
toward Craig told him "Get out, you're not living here." He may have also tried in some
way to stop Craig from entering the house. Craig stated "Oh, yeah, I'm moving back in,"
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to which Lowell responded "No, you're not." According to Lowell, Craig then struck
him in the eye area. Lowell fell to the floor and began crawling toward the front door.
As Lowell was crawling across the floor, Craig kicked Lowell numerous times across the
floor toward the front door. After kicking Lowell across the floor, Craig unlocked the
front door and shoved, kicked or threw Lowell's carcass out onto the front porch. Lowell
managed to get to a neighbor's and call police. (TR. 76 at 14-20).
Craig testified that upon his return to the house he went to the front door and put a
camera that was in his pocket in the mailbox to retrieve later. Craig stated that upon his
knocking, Lowell let him in the house through the front door. Craig stated that they
spoke for a short while and that Lowell began talking to him in a suggestive and offensive
way.

Craig stated that Lowell then put his arm around him and began to make

homosexual advances, eventually fondling or squeezing his groin area. Craig stated that
he attempted to leave when Lowell caught him in a massive bear hug from behind. Craig
struggled to free himself from Lowell's grip and finally had to bite Lowell on the arm to
break Lowell's grip. Craig then managed to push Lowell off him, but in doing so Lowell
stumbled back toward the kitchen/bedroom areas of the house. Craig feared Lowell
might obtain a weapon, like a knife or axe, from one of the other rooms and rather than
fumble with the double locks on the front door and escape, Craig decided to punch
Lowell in the eye a couple of times. Lowell dropped to the floor from the punches and
Craig then pushed and kicked Lowell across the floor toward the front door. With Lowell
"paralyzed," Craig was able to unlock the door and kick Lowell out onto the front porch.
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Craig then closed and locked the front door. Craig remained inside the house until police
arrived. (TR. 76 at 90-119).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The jury was presented with two diametrically opposed versions of the relevant
events that took place between Lowell and Craig Hendricks on September 9, 2000. In
determining credibility, the jury would determine whether self-defense was available to
Craig under the version of facts it accepted. By accepting Lowell's version of events, the
jury determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Craig did not factually have self-defense
available, regardless of whether it determined that Lowell had defense of habitation
available. If the jury accepted Lowell's version of events, as it obviously did, then the
defense of habitation only explained the factual basis of Lowell's confrontation of Craig
at the door of the kitchen and possible attempt to stop Craig from entering the house. The
instruction would not operate to abrogate Craig's claim of self-defense except to the
extent that the jury could reasonably determine that Craig was the initial aggressor or that
his use of force exceeded that degree of force necessary for self-defense to apply. In
either event, the jury could, and obviously did, determine that, under the accepted facts,
Craig did not have self-defense available. Because the jury could easily determine that
engaging in "fighting, violent, tumultuous or threatening behavior" as charged in the
disturbing the peace count could or should be included in any finding of guilt on the
battery count, it is not unusual for the jury to convict of battery and acquit on disturbing
the peace. Therefore, the conviction of appellant, Craig Hendricks, should be affirmed.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
The Instructions Regarding Self-Defense and Defense of Habitation
Are Either Complimentary To or Independent of Each Other
as Applied to Each of the Two Versions of Events,
This case is not one in which the instructions were difficult to apply or where the
instructions were confusing, misleading or contradictory. Rather, this case is one of
credibility. If the jury accepted Lowell's version of events from the time Craig entered
the house, then the defense of habitation instruction may apply to justify Lowell's
confrontation of Craig at the door in the kitchen. But under Lowell's version of events,
Craig would have no factual basis to claim self-defense. On the other hand, if the jury
accepted Craig's version of events from the time Craig entered the house, then Lowell
would have no factual basis to claim defense of habitation and Craig would have the
defense of self-defense available. What is clear from the jury's verdict is that they
believed Lowell and did not believe Craig. The instructions are exclusive to the different
versions of events, and neither was applicable under the other's version. Therefore, what
the jury did was to state by its verdict that it believed Lowell and that while Lowell may
have had defense of habitation available, Craig certainly did not have self-defense
available under the facts accepted by the jury.
As the Utah Supreme Court has reiterated over the years, "The purpose of giving
instructions to the jurors is to assist them in understanding issues which they have to
decide in the case." State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1994), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 858
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(1995); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 798-799 (Utah 1991); State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75,
78 (Utah 1981). In this case the two opposed versions of events required the jury to
decide the issues of credibility and self-defense. The instruction regarding use of force in
defense of habitation was not presented, in the context of the instructions as a whole, as
an affirmative defense, since Lowell was not on trial, but rather, in the context of
assisting the jury in understanding the claim of self-defense made by Craig. That use of
the instruction was disclosed to the trial judge in the discussion concerning inclusion of
the instruction. (TR. 76 at 46-47).
POINT II.
The Defense of Habitation Instruction Did Not Create a
Mandatory Rebuttable Presumption And Did Not
Shift the Burden of Proof.
It is a given that in a criminal case the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970). Based upon the presentation of some facts warranting such an instruction, in a
trial alleging assault or battery the defendant may request an instruction regarding selfdefense to address whether the use of force by defendant was justified. That is, whether
the use of force by defendant was unlawful. Such an instruction was requested and given
in the present matter. However, mere incantation of the term "self-defense" doesn't sell
the issue to the jury. There are still a number of factors the jury must weigh from all of
the evidence to determine whether the defendant's use of force was justified and
constituted self-defense. For example, the defendant can't claim self-defense if he was
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the initial aggressor, nor can the defendant use force excessive to that required to defend
himself from the other's actual or imminent use of force. U.C.A § 76-2-402. As stated
by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Storks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981), "one who
willingly and knowingly provokes a combat may be an aggressor, and if one who initially
was a non-aggressor escalates a fight beyond a level wliich would be justified in view of
the nature of the original provocation, then he loses the right to claim the defense of selfdefense." Id at 90.
The context of the instructions must be taken into consideration. An instruction
complained of must be read in light of its immediate context and the context of all of the
instructions as a whole. State v. Smith, 726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986). In the present
matter, it is clear that the defense of habitation instruction was not given as an instruction
of an affirmative defense. Rather, it was given solely to assist the jury in understanding
the self-defense claim being made by Craig. If the jury believed the version of events as
related by Craig, then there was no factual basis for the defense of habitation instruction,
and its inclusion would be at most harmless error. If, however, the jury believed the
version of events as related by Lowell, then Lowell's actions in aggressively approaching
Craig as he entered the house, telling him to get out and perhaps attempting to stop Craig
from entering the house should be evaluated as part of Craig's self-defense claim with the
use of the defense of habitation instruction to assist the jury in understanding and
determining the self-defense issue.
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A mandatory rebuttable presumption is a device that operates to relieve the
prosecution of the affirmative burden of persuasion on a presumed element by instructing
the jury that it must find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the jury
not to make such a finding. State v. Chambers, 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985). With regard
to the defense of habitation instruction, the jury was not instructed regarding any
presumption with regard to the defendant. Rather, the jury was instructed that if they
found that Craig's entry was unlawful and was made with force, then Lowell would have
a right to use reasonable force—which under Craig's version of events didn't happen
anyway—to prevent Craig's entry; and further, if the jury made those findings then
Lowell's use of force would be presumed to be reasonable. However, although Lowell
testified that he was approaching Craig telling to get out and may have tried to stop Craig
from entering the house, there was no testimony from either Lowell or Craig that Lowell
actually used force to prevent Craig's entry.

Therefore, there was no presumption

regarding the defendant—Craig—in the instruction. Since there was no presumption
regarding the defendant or his conduct in the instruction, there could be no shifting of the
burden of proof. All of the instructions taken in context as a whole clearly instruct the
jury that the burden of proof was right where it should be—on the prosecution. "In
criminal cases, the ultimate test of any [evidentiary] device's constitutional validity in a
given case remains constant: the device must not undermine the

fact-finder's

responsibility at trial, based on evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts
beyond a reasonable doubt." County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156
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(1979); Chambers, 709 P.2d at 325. Use of the defense of habitation instruction did not
undermine the fact-finder's responsibility in the present matter.

Rather, use of the

instruction, taken together with all of the other instructions regarding self-defense,
assisted the jury in its determination of the self-defense issue.

I can understand

appellant's disagreement with the jury's finding.
POINT III
At the Time of the Incident, Lowell did Have the Right to Deny
Appellant Entry into the Premises.
Lowell was the leaseholder for the premises. He allowed Craig to live there as a
permissive guest provided Craig paid something toward the rent and utilities. There was
never any written rental agreement between the two. (TR. 76 at 7-8). Following the
disagreement between the brothers in July, Lowell asked Craig to move out.

Craig

willingly and voluntarily moved out of the premises, thereby quitting or abandoning the
premises. (TR. 76 at 8, 86, 104-105). As pointed in the statement of facts, including
references to Craig's own testimony, he knew that he could not simply go over to
Lowell's house to retrieve any remaining property. He knew that he had to coordinate
with their father to be present in accordance with their agreement.
Contrary to appellant's assertion in his brief, there simply isn't enough evidence in
the record to establish that Craig was a tenant of Lowell's or that there was a landlord
tenant relationship between the two. Even if there was such a relationship, Craig's
abandonment or quitting of the premises would allow Lowell to exclude Craig from the
premises under U.C.A. § 78-36-12. Lastly, Craig knew that he had no right to enter
10

Lowell's house. When asked if he entered the house on September 8, 2000 before Lowell
returned home, Craig said "No because, I have to get a hold of him." (TR. 76 at 89).

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the trial court's
inclusion of the defense of habitation instmction be upheld, and that the verdict of the
jury finding the appellant guilty of battery be AFFIRMED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED t h i s f V ^ d a y of August, 2001.
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